THE CHALLENGES OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA
BY
COMMANDER SO AGADA
NIGERIAN NAVY
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF CERTIFICATE OF TRAINING IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (CITOPSO)
JANUARY 2008
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to first and foremost thank the Almighty God for his strength, grace and mercy in accomplishing this work. All that we know is a sum total of what we have learned from all who have taught us, either directly or indirectly.
I am forever indebted to the countless outstanding men and women who by their commitment and dedication to becoming the best they could be, have inspired me to do the same. In this wise I wish to sincerely thank my Thesis Advisor, Commodore Darius Onimole (Rtd), Pastor Paul Adefarasin my pastor and a host of others who space would not permit me to mention. I also thank Colonel Emeka Okonkwo, Major Victor Briggs (Rtd) and Susan Tarrien for their effort in facilitating my Thesis fees payment. My appreciation also goes to Harvey Langholtz, the Director UNITAR, the various Course Authors and other staff of the Institute for their services.
Finally I wish to say that, I am also deeply mindful of and thankful for the unparallel love, prayer, support and patience of my precious wife Mary and our daughters, Treasure and Divine during this work.
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that this work was carried out by Solomon Onyilo Agada under my supervision.
Thesis Advisor
Commodore Darius F. Onimole, rtd
FSS,MSS,DSS,fellowofwarCollege(fwc),psc(+), M.Sc Political Science(StrategicStudies)-University of Ibadan.
January 2008.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE (S)
TITLE PAGE .. i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .. . ii
CERTIFICATION .. . iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . iv-vii
LIST OF TABLES/FIGURES vii-ix
ABBREVIATIONS .. . x-xv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . ....... xvi-xix
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION PAGE (S)
BACKGROUND . 1-4
STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM . 5-7
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 7-8
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 8
RESEARCH DESIGN . . 9
INSTRUMENT FOR DATA COLLECTION .. 9
VALIDITY/RELIABILITY OF INSTRUMENT 10
METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 11
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 11
LIMITATIONS 11-12
DEFINITION OF TERMS 12-16
NOTES AND REFERENCES 17-20
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW PAGE (S)
CONCEPT OF CONFLICT .. 21-27
THEORIES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION .. 28-30
CONCEPT OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY .. 30-32
CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING ... 32-39
NOTES AND REFERENCES .... 40-44
CHAPTER THREE
CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA PAGE (S)
BACKGROUND AND CAUSES OF THE
CONFLICT IN SOMALIA 45-47
UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA .. 48-52
NOTES AND REFERENCES .. 53
CHAPTER FOUR
CHALLENGES TO UNITED NATIONS PAGE (S)
PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA AND
THE WAY FORWARD
PREAMBLE . 54-55
SLOW RATE OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS DEPLOYMENT . 55-58
NON ROBUST MANDATE . 58
INEFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGO . 58-59
INADEQUATE MANPOWER AND LOGISTICS . 59-62
NON COOPERATION OF WARLORDS . 62-63
NON TACKLING OF ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT .. 63
NON PARTICIPATION OF TROOPS FROM
DEVELOPED NATIONS .. 64-66
UNDERSTANDING SENITIVITY OF THE PEOPLE ... 66-67
RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY ..... 67-68
ROBUST OPEATIONAL MANDATES .. .. 68-69
ACQUIRING TROOPS FROM DEVELOPED NATIONS . 69-71
EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGO .. 72-73
COMMITMENT AND COOPERATION OF
THE WARLORDS ... 73-74
ADEQUATE FUNDING AND LOGISTICS .. 74-75
ENDNOTES AND REFERENCES . 76-79
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS PAGE (S)
CONCLUSION ... 80-83
RECOMMENDATIONS 84
ENDNOTES 85-93
LIST OF TABLES
|
Serial |
Title of Table |
Page No(s) |
|
(a) |
(b) |
(c) |
|
1.
2. |
Past and Present United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.
Differences between Settlement and Resolution approaches to Conflict. |
4
28 |
LIST OF FIGURES
|
Serial |
Title of Figure |
Page No(s) |
|
(a) |
(b) |
(c) |
|
1.
2. |
Conflict Triangle
Ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Missions |
22
38 |
ABBREVIATIONS
AHQ - Army Headquarters
AU - African Union
AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
CAR - Central African Republic
CNN - Cable News Network
BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation
BINUB - United Nations Integrated Office in
Burundi
Brig Gen - Brigadier General
CoG - Centre of Gravity
Col - Colonel
DP - Decisive Point
DPKO - Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG - Economic Community of West African
States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African
States
ED - Editor
EU - European Union
FC - Force Commander
GA - General Assembly
ICG - International Crisis Group
IDPs - Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on
Development
ISS - Institute of Security Studies
Lt Col - Lieutenant Colonel
Maj Gen - Major General
MILOBs - Military Observers
MINURCA - United Nations Mission in the Central Africa Republic.
MINURSO - United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
MINUSTAH - United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti.
MONUC - United Nations Mission in Democratic
Republic of Congo
NA - Nigerian Army
NGOs - Non Governmental Organisations
NIIA - Nigeria Institute of International Affairs
OAU - Organization of African Unity
OIOS - Office of Internal Oversight Services
ONUB - United Nations Mission in Burundi
ONUC - United Nations Operation in Congo
ONUMOZ - United Nations Operation in
Mozambique
PKO - Peace-Keeping Operation
PM - Prime Minister
PSO - Peace Support Operations
RTD - Retired
SADC - Southern African Development
Community
SAIIA - South Africa Institute of International
Affairs
SALW - Small Arms and Light Weapons
SC - Security Council
SG - Secretary General
SLOC - Sea Lanes Of Communication
SOFA - Status Of Forces Agreement
SRSG - Special Representative of the
Secretary General
TCC - Troop Contributing Countries
TFG - Transitional Federal Government
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations
UNAMA - United Nations Mission in Afganistan
UNAMIR - United Nations Mission in Rwanda
UNAMIS - United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNASOG - United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UNAMSIL - United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM - United Nations Angolan Verification Mission
UNDOF - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF - United Nations Emergency Force
UNIFIL - United Nations Interim Force in
Lebanon
UNITARPOCI - United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instructions.
UNMEE - United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea
UNFICYP - United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIK - United Nations Mission in Iraq-Kuwait
UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS - United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMIT - United Nations Intergrated Mission in Timor- Leste.
UNMOGIP - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.
UNOCI - United Nations Mission in Corte D' Ivoire
UNOMIG - United Nations Observer Mission in
Georgia.
UNOMIL - United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL - United Nations Observer Mission in
Sierra Leone
UNOSOM - United Nations Operation in Somalia.
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAG - United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO - United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
USA - United States of America
USC - United Somalia Council
USIP - United States Institute for Peace
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The desire to carry out this study emanated from the realization that within the 62 years of existence of the UN, it has established about 61 PKOs, with Africa accounting for the highest number of these missions. Unfortunately, only few of these PKOs have been successfully handled or resulted in lasting peace.
This study first examines the history, theory and concept of conflict, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, and then made use of the Somalia crisis to generalise the demanding task of UN PKO in Africa. The main focus was to identify the likely impediment and critical areas to this phenomenon as well as proffer strategies to making humanitarian interventions and/or PKOs more effective, especially in Africa.
The study established that the paucity of some deliberate or careful steps that need to be taken to consolidate and sustain peace generally may be the greatest challenges to PKO in Africa. These include the need for robust and timely operational mandate, and where or when desirable, effective enforcement of arms embargo. Others include rapid deployment capability, commitment and co-operation of the belligerents and understanding the sensitivity of would-be recipients, amongst other essential details.
Also, within its first sixty years of existence, it is observed that there had been only two clear-cut cases of what had originally been proclaimed as the UN's most important function: its capacity to marshal military power against aggression - the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950, and the response of the UN to it under Chapter VII of the Charter - authorizing a full military action under the UN Flag and under US command against the North Korean attack. During this time the erstwhile USSR had boycotted all UN meetings in protest against the People's Republic of China being excluded from China's seat in the United Nations. This allowed US President Harry Truman a free hand at the Security Council. The second was in 1990 with the Cold War restrictions over, the Security Council unanimously and immediately authorized again, under US command, a coalition to eject Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait.
The operations in Korea and Iraq achieved their objectives - the former with great military sacrifice - mainly due to very clear and timely mandate, with far enough and readily available needed military resources. On the other hand, the United State's intervention in Somalia in 1992-93 was partly successful due to what can be classified as erroneous strategy of statecraft. The US had started with coercive diplomacy - or forceful persuasion - through a threat to react with overwhelming military force should the Somali warlords (who had been using starvation of civilians as a means of waging war), opposed the US humanitarian relief intervention to bring food to over 2 million starving population. Once that phase of intervention proved successful, then the United Nations, through the backing of Clinton's administration, undertook a much more broader mandate - the reconstruction of the Somali Government, along with a dangerous and precarious attempt at disarming of the warlords' militias - but with a force far smaller than the one used to stop the starvation. Consequently our study attempted some suggestions to these dilemmas and proffered remedies in order to improve the capacity to manage future UN PKOs in Africa, with derivable recommendations that the USA and other major developed powers should be urgently encouraged and motivated to deploy troops for PKOs in Africa, despite the unfortunate disaster of 1993 in Somalia. And that the United Nations should henceforth seek to ensure effective implementation of arms embargo it imposes on warring parties. Finally, that the UN in conjunction with TCC should ensure proper training of all peacekeepers in the art of conflict management, logistics planning and other field operational techniques before their deployment to mission areas.
CHAPTER ONE
1.00 INTRODUCTION
1.01 Background
As it is well known, the UN was formed after the Second World War primarily, among other reasons to maintain international peace and security.1 The founders of the UN had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in PKOs thus, PKO was not mentioned in the original UN Charter. However, a former UNSG, Dag Hammarskjold referred to it as Chapter VI and half.2 This is because it falls between provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter which provides for pacific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII which enables enforcement actions by the UNSC. Implementation of these Chapters relies largely on the consensus of the SCs permanent members namely China, France, USSR now Russia Federation, the UK and the USA.3
Until the end of the Cold War, the increasing disagreement between the then 2 super powers made this collective security system unworkable, this led to the conception of PKOs. Under the collective security system, when dispute arises between 2 governments, the parties concerned are obligated to seek a solution by peaceful means. This is under Chapter VI of the UN Charter mainly by, negotiation, reconciliation, mediation, arbitration, peaceful settlement or resort to regional agencies.
If the peaceful means fail and the dispute escalates into an armed conflict, then Chapter VII of the UN Charter comes into play.4 This constitutes the core of the UN Collective Security System. It provides that in the case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression the SC may take enforcement measures to restore international peace in such situations. These measures are essentially, arms embargoes, complete or partial economic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, and in the last resort the use of force.
UNEF, the first actual UN peacekeeping operations was formed in 1956 during the Suez Canal Crisis5. It provided the model for classical peacekeeping which requires the consent of the protagonists, impartiality on the part of UN forces and resort to use of arms only in self defence. The immediate objective of this classical form of peacekeeping was to facilitate conditions for a more comprehensive peace agreement.6Besides UN peacekeeping in Africa, AU, ECOWAS and SADC have also contributed significantly to peacekeeping efforts in the continent. Table 1 shows the list of past and present UN PKOs in Africa.
1.02 TABLE 1. PAST AND PRESENT UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA
|
Serial |
Mission |
Duration |
|
(a) |
(b) |
(c) |
|
1. |
ONUC |
Jul 60 - Jun 64 |
|
2. |
UNEF I |
Nov 56 - Jan 67 |
|
3. |
UNEF II |
Oct 73 - Jul 79 |
|
4. |
UNAVEM 1 |
Jan 89 - May 91 |
|
5. |
UNOSOM 1 |
Apr 92 - Sep 93 |
|
6. |
UNASOG |
May 94 Jun 94 |
|
7. |
UNOMUR |
Jun 93 - Sep 94 |
|
8. |
UNOMIL |
Sep 93 Sep 94 |
|
9. |
ONUMOZ |
Dec 92 - Dec 94 |
|
10. |
UNAVEM II |
May 91 Feb 95 |
|
11. |
UNOSOM II |
Mar 93 - Mar 95 |
|
12. |
UNAMIR |
Oct 93 - Mar 96 |
|
13. |
UNAVEM III |
Feb 95 Jul 97 |
|
14. |
MONUA |
Jun 97- Feb 99 |
|
15. |
UNOMSIL |
Jul 88 Oct 99 |
|
16. |
MINURCA |
Apr 98- Feb 00 |
|
17. |
MONUC |
Nov 99 Till date |
|
18. |
MINURSO |
Apr 91 Till date |
|
19. |
UNAMSIL |
Oct 99- Dec 05 |
|
20. |
ONUB |
Jun 04- Dec 06 |
|
21. |
UNMEE |
Jul 00- Till date |
|
22. |
MINUCI |
May 03-Apr 04 |
|
22. |
UNMIL |
Sep 03- Till date |
|
23. |
UNOCI |
Aug 04- Till date |
|
24. |
UNMIS |
Mar 05- Till date |
|
25. |
BINUB |
Dec 06- Till date |
Source: http://www.un.org
1.03 Statement of the Research Problem
The UN has played a vital role in mediating peace agreements and assisting in their implementation, helping to reduce the level of conflict in several regions especially in Africa. However, some of those accords failed to take hold then, such as in Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994.7 Additionally, the current situations in Cote D Ivoire, Darfur-Sudan, DRC and Somalia unfortunately have not changed too positively. This has resulted in severe IDPs and refugee problems further compounding the security situation in and around such conflict areas.
It is estimated that roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within 5 years due to some challenges.8 This drives home the point that, to prevent conflict, peace agreements must be implemented in a sustained manner. Most of these conflicts are known to be contagious and thus have spill-over effects to other nations while new ones are also unfolding, such as in CAR, Chad and Guinea. All these complex crises cry out for UN intervention. Meanwhile, there was already the problem of the World Body having taken on too many missions in recent times; for example, within 1988 to 1994 alone, the number of blue-helmeted troops had increased from 9,570 to 73,393 and an exponential soaring in the peace operations budget from $230 million to $3.6 billion.9 It is in view of the foregoing that this study seeks to address the challenges of PKOs in Africa after the end of the Cold War with particular emphasis on Somalia.
Moreover, until very recently, it is well known that there has been a systematic neglect of Africa security matters by the trio of France, UK and USA since after the Cold War.10 This makes it necessary for Africans to properly understand the ongoing global reforms to ensure lasting solution to their conflicts. Kofi Annan the immediate past UNSG reiterated this position by advising member states of the UN to seek alternative remedies of handling conflicts in their various regions.11 Mr Tony Blair as British PM, also declared same position while commenting on the situation in Zimbabwe for African leaders to act.12
Since conflicts are intrinsically bound to occur, Africans must begin to address issues that will enable them manage conflicts in the continent effectively in concert with the UN. This study will therefore seek to answer the following pertinent questions:
Why has conflict situations in Africa increased after the Cold War?
What is the common nature and underlying causes of these conflicts?
What are the challenges facing UN PKOs in Africa and how can these challenges be tackled?
1.04 Objective of the Study. The purpose of the study is to examine the challenges of UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa. However, the specific objectives of the study are:
To identify the challenges confronting UN peacekeeping in Africa using UN PKO in Somalia in 1991 as a case study.
To design strategies towards effective UN peacekeeping in Africa.
1.05 Significance of the Study. Following the end of the Cold War, there were renewed calls for the UN to become the agency for achieving world peace, as several dozen military conflicts continue to rage around the globe. With this, there has been an increased need for peacekeeping in Africa due to increased conflict situations in the continent.13 With the seemingly lax attitude of some major players in the UN towards African security,14 the continents security issues needs to be addressed adequately by Africans in conjunction with the UN.
This study therefore, is expected to benefit researchers, analysts, and policy makers in formulating a framework to overcome the challenges of UN PKO in Africa for successful future peacekeeping. Furthermore it is hoped that its findings could stimulate further research in the field of UN PKOs. The study would also contribute to existing body of knowledge in the field of peacekeeping.
1.06 Research Design. The study considered that UN PKOs in Africa is plagued by some challenges. It also considered that even though UN PKOs started in Africa about 50 years ago, it is still not as successful as it should have been. Consequently, the research was designed as a case study using the conflict situation in Somalia to bring out the general challenges facing UN PKOs in Africa. The background and UN interventions in the conflict shall be highlighted to bring forth the challenges accordingly. Furthermore, the research sought to proffer strategies to overcome the challenges facing UN PKOs in Africa to ensure successful PKO leading to sustainable peace in Africa.
1.07 Instruments for Data Collection. The instruments used for data collection were books, magazines, journals, newspapers and the internet. Other instruments used were, the electronic media, published and unpublished materials from libraries. Personal interviews and discussion with resource persons were also used.
1.08 Validity/Reliability of Instruments. In order to ensure the validity of the instruments used for data collection, they were subjected to scrutiny. This was to eliminate any trace of bias or prejudice. Furthermore, various information obtained were crosschecked with independent sources for fair assessment and authenticity.
Where traces of bias or prejudice were found such data were discarded. In the case of oral interviews, conscious efforts were made to distinguish facts from personal opinions. This necessitated in-depth analysis.
1.09 Method of Data Analysis. Information obtained were analysed qualitatively to arrive at the synthesis presented. However, in some instances, historical, descriptive and comparative approaches were adopted. Data obtained from interviews and discussions with resource persons were analyzed in a descriptive form.
1.10 Scope of Study. The study examines the civil war and UN PKO in Somalia. This is because of its peculiar characteristics, its strategic position in the horn of Africa and its uniqueness in many respects. For the first time, the UN maintained a peace mission in a country without a government; this was not without consequences. For instance due to lack of understanding of the concept of the second generation peacekeeping, the mission was faced with severe political and operational difficulties.
The study will also draw examples from UN PKOs in Africa within the pre and post Cold War era and considers strategies that could be used to improve future UN peacekeeping in Africa. It is assumed that the UN will continue to employ peacekeeping as a means of conflict resolution generally, especially in Africa.