SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON PRE-DEPLOYMENT
MISSION READINESS PREPARATION OF PERSONNEL TO BE
DEPLOYED IN PEACE MISSIONS[1]
A THESIS
BY
CAPTAIN (NAVY) CHARLES H. ROSS
SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE
PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE CERTIFICATE OF TRAINING IN UNITED NATIONS
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
SUBMITTED :
DATE : 24 April 2008
FORWARDED RECOMMENDED APPROVAL :
DATE :
APPROVAL :
DATE :
LIST OF CONTENTS
|
CHAP |
TOPIC |
PAGE |
1. Introduction 6
2. Conceptual Framework of the Thesis 11
a. Evolution of Peacekeeping Operations 11
i. Period 1945 to 1987 12
ii. Period 1988 to 1996 14
iii. Period 1997 to 2007 16
iv. Comments 18
b. Guiding Parameters 19
i. South African White Paper on Participation in International 19
Peace Missions
ii. United Nations Peacekeeping Training Manual 21
iii. United Nations Security Council Resolution 23
iv. Guidelines to Troop Contributing Countries Contributing 24
Military Units to a Specific Mission
v. Force Requirement 27
vi. Concept of Operations 27
vii. Letter of Assist 27
3. Tasks, Skills, Knowledge and Attitude Required for Successful 28
Participation in a Peace Missions
a. Tasks 28
i. Strategic 28
ii. Military-Strategic 29
iii. Operational 30
iv. Tactical 30
b. Attitude, Knowledge and Skills 34
i. Strategic 35
ii. Military-Strategic 35
iii. Operational 38
iv. Tactical 40
c. Conclusions 42
4. Pre-deployment Combat Readiness Preparations 43
a. Introduction 43
b. Formed Military Units 43
i. Infantry Battalions 44
ii. Engineer Squadrons 46
iii. Air Units 47
iv. Maritime Units 48
v. Medical Units 50
vi. Specialist Units 51
vii. Support Elements 56
c. Individuals 57
i. Officers Commanders 57
ii. Delegates 58
iii. Military Observers 58
iv. Military Staff Officers 59
d. Formal Training 60
5. Pre-deployment Mission Readiness Preparations 61
a. Introduction 61
b. Strategic 62
c. Military-Strategic 64
d. Operational 67
e. Tactical 69
i. Formed Military Units 69
ii. Individuals 76
6. Determining the Gaps between Combat and Mission 83
Readiness Preparedness
7. Conclusion 85
Bibliography
Biography
Glossary.
Appendix A : Schematic Presentation of the Process for Preparing Personnel for deployment.
Appendix B : Peacekeeping Operations Established during 1945 to 1987.
Appendix C : Peacekeeping Operations Established during 1988 to 1996.
Appendix D : Peacekeeping Operations Established during 1997 to 2007.
Appendix E : Skills – Knowledge Required per Appointment or Post.
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
“The worst moment for me came in Congo (DRC) in 2003 when there was
suddenly a risk that the whole situation in the north-eastern part of the
country (DRC) would unravel. Massacres were happening in Ituri and Bunia.
We (MONUC) clearly did not have enough troops on the spot for the
crisis, and our reserve force consisted of only one battalion
that was not trained to address an emergency like this one.”[2]
Conflict has been part of mankind since the earliest days with the strongest emerging victorious as the norm. Conflicts have largely been between clans or tribes or nations in pursuit of one or other resource that was not available to them or in pursuance of power in the region. Attempts to resolve conflicts peacefully, or conduct “peacekeeping”, did not come about until late in the 10th Century through the medieval Catholic Church vide its “Peace of God and Truce of God” initiatives. During the 17th century the first “concept” of getting world leaders to resolve their differences by peaceful means emerged in the idea of Emeric Crucé who proposed that “world leaders would meet in a neutral location to resolve the issue”.[3]
The first International attempt to prevent future conflicts escalating into international armed conflict that could plunge the World into a new war was the establishment of the League of Nations following the 1st World War. Intention of the League of Nations was to be “an association of states designed to replace traditional power politics in an organisation that would use peaceful negotiations to maintain International peace and security”.[4] While the League of Nations enjoyed some success it however met with repeated challenges and a number of member states withdrew. The League of Nations was however unable to prevent the 2nd World War and was ultimately replaced by the United Nations (UN).
Following the end of the 2nd World War the UN was established with a charter that called on member states to resolve their conflict peacefully by means of negotiation, mediation and facilitation. Early days of the UN saw the deployment of military observers and military forces as inter-positioning forces in conflicts of inter-state nature for which, it is anticipated, little or relatively low pre-deployment training was required. The reason for this is the fact that the military was the major participator in the peace process and “only had to keep the fighting forces apart”.
Today peacekeepers face a totally different environment with numerous role players in the peace process as well as in the conflict. Majority of today’s conflicts are of intra-state nature where the “opposition” is rarely identifiable and the conflict of a nature that may even differ from one area of operation to another area of operation. This may be due to the fact that some belligerents or opposition are not necessarily fighting another belligerents or opposition force on a political issue, but rather for the control of natural resources. The latter may be exported in accordance with an agreement that would in return provide weaponry and other logistics to sustain the fighting[5].
In today’s conflicts the military is integrated into a multidimensional peace mission where it is required to create an environment within which the diplomatic and political process can proceed to secure a lasting peace agreement. In executing this task the military are today often deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter where the use of force may be required. It is important to remember that peace cannot be achieved by the military alone. If this were the case a very large military force, which is currently not available to the UN, would be required and would have to force the belligerents into compliance with the peace process.
Where there is no peace to keep the UN may “Authorise the Coalition of the Willing”, directed by a lead nation, who have both the political will and military capacity to bring and end to the conflict using all necessary means. The latter is obviously not what is required in support of a peace mission, however the situation may arise where such aggressive action is required. Although this type of interventions are authorised by the Security Council (SC), they are not conducted under UN command.[6]
In addition to the multidimensional nature of today’s peace missions conflicts are of a much more violent nature and peacekeepers are often confronted with atrocities seldom heard of, or seen before. Add to these atrocities the fact of being confronted by child and women soldiers then the question can be asked, how are peacekeepers prepared, not just physically, but also mentally to handle situations likes this?
Today’s development in the communication spectrum brings conflicts to the lounges of everybody who owns a television or mobile telephone, as it happens. This means that current deployed peacekeepers should always be aware of this and that any negative action that is taken will be broadcasted to the world even before his/her commander is informed. Positive use of the media to promote the mission is something that needs to be addressed and the paper will address it in more detail later.
To be able to participate in these complex and multidimensional peace missions’ personnel should be highly professional, trained and equipped. Troop contributing countries should therefore take serious notice of what is required, and the consequences, when deploying under Chapter VII and this paper intend returning to this later.
The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States of America (USA) on 11 September 2001 by the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation added a new dimension to the threat to International Peace and Security. Suddenly the “Global War against Terrorism” became the topic of the day with the launching of a number of “intervention” operations against alleged terrorist territories and strongholds. Are these operations classified as peacekeeping operations? No these are not peacekeeping operations, but rather intervention operations involving multi-national forces not under command of the UN.
EMPLOYMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE
In accordance with the South African Constitution the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) can be deployed under the following conditions :
Section 200 (2) : The primary objective of the Defence Force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.
Section 201 (2) : Only the President, as head of the National Executive, may authorise the employment of the Defence Force :
In cooperation with the Police Service
In defence of the Republic
In fulfilment of an International Obligation
The SANDF comprises 4 (four) Services, Army, Air Force, Navy and Military Health Services who are the primary providers of combat forces to the Joint Operations Division. The Services are supported by a number of Divisions providing supporting services. Joint Operations Division is responsible for all “actions associated with executing the Department of Defence decisions and orders with regard to the deployment of forces within the context of the Department of Defence’s policy and strategy”.
In accordance with the Military Strategy, South Africa will participate in operations with a “Mission Based Task Force” that have received “Mission Essential Training”. To comply with this concept the SANDF needs to identify “Mission Essential Training” at an early stage during the preparation phase to ensure that both Combat Readiness[7] and Mission Readiness[8] training is done.
This paper will address the evolution of peacekeeping operations, analyse all guidance that are provided and how these impact on the preparation of personnel, tasks that are to executed as identified from the guidance, skills that are required to execute the identified tasks, training that needs to be provided during Combat Readiness and which during Mission Readiness. Experiences gained during South African deployments will be analysed to determine amendments to preparedness. Finally the paper will address the role of the various Services and Divisions and their responsibilities to ensure South Africans deploy with the correct attitude, improved skills and the necessary knowledge to contribute to the success of their mission.
A schematic illustration of the process is attached as Appendix A to this paper.
CHAPTER 2 : CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS
“Once some level of significant violence has begun, it is prone to escalate because an interactive process of attack and retaliation leads to a self-perpetuating cycle”[9]
a. EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
The UN Charter, signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, describes the main purpose of the organisation as “to maintain International Peace and Security”. This assumption was based on the continued cooperation between the World War II allies, China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States of America who later became the 5 Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Where other states could not resolve their disputes peacefully the UNSC would act together to resolve the dispute peacefully.
The increase in tension between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) after the 2nd World War impeded on the functioning of the Security Council, who had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the UN.
While the term “Peacekeeping” does not appear in the UN Charter, Mr Marrack Goulding, United Nations Under Secretary General for Political Affairs characterised peacekeeping as “Field operations, established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations Command and Control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extend necessary”.[10] Soon after 1947 peacekeeping became a pragmatic instrument to manage conflict in a divided world where major players in the International system nevertheless sometimes shared a common interest in containing regional conflicts and prevent them from escalating into wider confrontation[11].
In terms of the UN Charter international peace and security had to be maintained in accordance with Chapters VI, peaceful resolution, and VII, enforcement measures. Chapter VIII provides for the UN to utilise regional organisations to become involved in resolving regional conflicts. Where the situation demands immediate action to prevent genocide or to prevent grave human rights violations the UN have called on the “coalition of the willing” to undertake such intervention operations on behalf of, but not commanded by, the UN.
This paper will analyse the evolution of peacekeeping in an attempt to establish the impact that the evolution had on the preparation of individuals and force structure elements for deployment. It will however not investigate each mission and the possible impact that the mission had on preparation. Specific missions which may have had an impact will be discussed in more detail.
Organisation for African Unity.
When the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 its Charter did not provide for “collective security” and the powers of the Administrative Secretary General was purposely limited. Lack of enthusiasm of the member states to become involved in the resolution of conflict is evident in that the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established and places filled in 1968, but never functioned.[12] This situation forced the OAU to rely on Ad-Hoc committees and/or eminent persons for conflict resolutions.
i. PERIOD 1945 TO 1987.
During this period peacekeeping operation where primarily deployed to maintain ceasefires and stabilising situations on the ground to establish an environment within which the Political and Diplomatic process could continue to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. To achieve this the UN primarily deployed Military Observers and lightly armed troops who monitored the ceasefires or peace agreements, investigated and reported on violations of the ceasefire or peace agreements and assisted with confidence building. Deployment during this period was done with the consent of the relevant parties or countries involved in the conflict and tasks varied between observing compliance with ceasefires, and reporting and investigating of any breeches of the ceasefire agreements.
It is interesting to note that during the 1st peacekeeping operation, United Nations Good Office Commission (UNGOC), utilised the locally deployed military attaches to fulfil the function of observing compliance with the ceasefire agreement and the repatriation of the Dutch forces[13]. As the personnel were already in country, it can be assumed that they did not receive any additional or special training for the execution of their tasks.
Another important aspect during this period is the fact that a number of missions were established utilising personnel from already established missions to ensure that the new missions are established very quickly.
The UN Mission in the Congo[14] (ONUC), established following the mutiny of the Congolese Armed Force, requires mentioning. In accordance with the mandate ONUC had to assist the Congolese Government with “such military assistance as may be necessary until the Congolese Security Forces could take over the tasks”.[15] To ensure a speedy deployment forces from UNTSO and UNEF were re-deployed while a number of African States provided forces. Achieving the objectives, restore law and order and ensure speedy withdrawal of Belgium Forces proved more difficult than initially anticipated, however it was eventually achieved. Changes in the mandate, to use of force in an attempt to avert a full scale civil war in the Congo” and “to use force to remove mercenaries from Katanga” was required to achieve this Achieving this finally required, for the 1st time in the history of the UN, the use of combat aircraft[16]. While it would appear that ONUC should have had a Chapter VII mandate no evidence could be found that was so. Was this possible an oversight?
Appendix B reflects the peacekeeping operations that were established during this period.
Organisation for African Unity.
A request during 1963 by the OAU for the deployment of military officers to supervise a ceasefire between Algeria and Morocco met with no response from member states while the OAU was sidelined in attempting to resolve the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964 and the ongoing conflict in the Congo[17]. It also failed to intervene meaning fully in the Nigerian Civil War during 1967 to 1970.[18]
The OAU did intervene in the Chadian civil war that started in 1960 with political and diplomatic efforts and later with the deployment of the large scale multinational Neutral Force in Chad during the crisis of 1981 – 1982. Prior to the deployment of the Neutral Force various regional peacekeeping deployments occurred. The OAU claimed “ownership” of some of these deployments.
ii. PERIOD 1988 to 1996
Following the end of the Cold War the UNSC began to function more as a cohesive council allowing the council to proceed with the establishing of peacekeeping operations and other intervention operations. This revitalised situation however also brought with it the eruption of historical ethnic and religious conflict, greedy and ambitious leaders which were prevented from escalating due to the pressure of the super powers.
The period immediately following the end of the Cold War did bring success to the peacekeeping operations deployed, resulting in the UN being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1988. This achievement and the decisive actions taken during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq contributed to new expectation from the International community that the UN is able to “ensure International Peace and Security”. Unfortunately this expectation was tarnished with the challenges experienced in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda.
During this period peacekeepers were confronted by some of the most brutal violence and human rights abuses ever experienced. Most conflicts were accompanied by massive humanitarian requirements, which resulted in an increase in the number of non-governmental and private volunteer organisations into the mission areas. As a result of this more and more people were displaced, either as internally displaced persons or refugees.
While the majority of the peacekeeping operations authorised during this period remained observer missions with the primary objective of observing and verifying implementation of peace agreements, a small number had to be mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter. The shift from inter-state to intra-state conflicts continued with only two of the peacekeeping operations mandated was for inter-state conflicts. Appendix C reflects the peacekeeping operations that were established during this period.
Peacekeepers were deployed under a variety of mandates ranging from traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peacekeeping to the utilisation of “the coalition of the willing”. The latter being led by a member state and authorised to “use all measures” to restore the situation. These types of operations are very expensive and require nations with suitable forces available, something the United Nations does have on call. During this period the United Nations were forced to authorise 4 such operations, UNITAF (Somalia), Operation TURQUOISE (Rwanda), Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY (Haiti) and IFOR (Yugoslavia).
Another phenomenon that arose during this period originated from the fact that member states were losing personnel in some of the multidimensional of “robust” peacekeeping operations. As a result of this member states imposed caveats on their respective contingents deploying in peacekeeping operation. Caveats placed on national contingents included the “non participation in Chapter VII actions” or the restriction on the lowest sub-sub-unit that can be deployed or restricted to a specific sector or area. This placed additional burdens on the respective Force Commanders as deployment of these contingents had to consider continuously resulting in that the force could not optimally achieve its military objectives.
Organisation for African Unity
During 1990 the OAU decided to deploy a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, known as the Military Observer Team (MOT), which indicated a change in the approach of the organisation. Finding member states to participate remained a challenge and when the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) was authorised with strength of 50, only 40 were deployed by the time NMOG was replaced by NMOG II.[19] While NMOG II, with an anticipated force level of 240 military observers, faced many operational difficulties it did achieve the political goal in “forcing” the UNSC to become involved in Rwanda. NMOG II was incorporated into UNAMIR in Nov 93. The OAU then deployed the observer mission in Burundi, OMIB.
iii. PERIOD 1997 to 2007
Peacekeeping operations up to 1997 was largely categorised with the deployment of operations under Chapter VI[20] of the UN Charter and was mandated to verify, monitor and observe peace agreements. While a number of peacekeeping operations established since 1997 was still deployed to verify, monitor and observe, the majority of the operations were deployed authorising the operation to execute specific tasks under Chapter VII of the Charter. Appendix D reflects the peacekeeping operations authorised during the period.
Of the 20 missions that were authorised since 1997, 10 were mandated under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In addition the UN authorised 4 additional operations in support of existing United Nations peacekeeping operations. One of these, UNITAF (a UN sanctioned joint multinational operation also known as Operation RESTORE HOPE and led by the USA), was authorised under Chapter VIII of the Charter and deployed in support of UNOSOM 1 over the period December 1992 to May 1993 where after UNOSOM 2 was established. This was possible the first time that such a deployment mandated under Chapter VIII.
Deployment of Civilian Police (United Nations Police – UNPOL) increased during this period while formed police units also deployed in specific peacekeeping operations like the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). In MONUC police units assisted the local police in crowd control in the run-up and during the elections in 2006. During the elections in the DRC the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of European Union Force in the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo) over the period June to November 2006. EUFOR RD Congo deployed independently in support of MONUC.
United Nations Organisation Mission In The Democratic Republic Of Congo (MONUC)
MONUC can be described as the mission where the United Nations demonstrated its intension to utilise its mandate of Chapter VII to the fullest in “Robust Peacekeeping”. MONUC established the Eastern Divisional Headquarters where for the first time a Division comprising 3 Brigades, with the relevant support elements (inclusive of attack helicopters) were deployed in a UN peacekeeping operation.
Continued unrest in the Ituri region the UNSC authorised the deployment of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), Operation ARTEMIS, under Chapter VII of the Charter. Operation ARTEMIS was a European Union initiative led by France and had as objective to “stabilise the situation to allow the peace process could move forward” and deployed over the period 12 Jun 03 to 15 Sep 03.
Following the deployment of IEMF the Ituri Brigade was established which managed to contain the security situation to a degree while getting on with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process. However early in 2004 some of the newly integrated soldiers of the new DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) mutinied against the new appointed commander. Ituri Brigade was reinforced with units from elsewhere in the mission area and by November 2004 was able to consolidate its position.
This prompted the UNSC to further increase the troop strength of MONUC to 16 700, well below the recommended strength of 23 000. This also authorised the establishment of the Eastern Division Brigade on 24 January 2005 who went onto the “offensive in terms of its mandate” almost immediately when on 1 March 2005 a major cordon and search operation was conducted in Ituri. This “offensive” was led by Units from the Ituri, North and South Kivu Brigades and was supported by attack helicopters and resulted in the killing of 50 renegade militia and arresting a number of belligerent that were responsible for the earlier attacks on MONUC. Since then the Eastern Division continued to execute its mandate aggressively.
MONUC, supported by the European Union Force (EUFOR RDC) which was deployed under a UNSC Chapter VII resolution, conducted numerous operations in support of the elections during 2006. One of the major tests for MONUC was the unrest that developed following the announcement of the results of the first round of elections and the forceful disarming of the personal guards of the former Vice President by the FARDC.
Organisation for African Unity / African Union
The OAU continued with smaller observer type peacekeeping missions in support of elections in Comoros. In July 2002 the African Union was established, replacing the OAU. The African Union (AU) soon launched its first peacekeeping operation when it took over the South African Protection and Support Detachment (SAPSD) in Burundi and established the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) on 01 May 2003.
AMIB was taken over by the United Nations on 01 June 2004 by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). During July 2004 the AU established its second peacekeeping operation when the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established while maintaining the very important person’s protection function in Burundi with the African Union Protection Force. In addition to these missions the AU is also involved in the peacekeeping mission in Somalia with the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
iv. COMMENTS
The above illustrated that today’s peacekeepers require comprehensive mission readiness training prior to deployment to enable them to execute the mandate entrusted to them. To meet this requirement “strategic corporals” are required. “A good peacekeeper should be trained for the widest spectrum of violence ; fighting a war”.[21]
b. GUIDING PARAMETERS
For each United Nations, and it is anticipated that in the future it will apply to African Union, peace missions a number of guidin