HARNESSING THE LOGISTICS OF                                           PEACEKEEPING    OPERATIONS

 

 

 

 

 

                                         BY

 

 

 

 

 

                 SQUADRON LEADER HENRY N YURKUSI

                               NIGERIAN AIR FORCE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF CERTIFICATE OF TRAINING IN PEACE SUPPORT  OPERATIONS (COTIPSO)

 

 

 

JANUARY 2008 

 

 

 

 

 

                                       

 

 

 

                    

                                             DEDICATION  

 

This work is dedicated to my late cousin Mr Ismael Aaron Yurkusi, who died in active service of his fatherland during the Nigerian graduate’s programme of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) and to all those who laid their lives in the course of ensuring peace all over the world.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

 

       Many people contributed to the success of this study. It would be difficult to mention their names and to thank them all enough, but I think I owe these wonderful people a lot of gratitude for their efforts. I am highly indebted to the following people: my thesis adviser Commodore Darius Onimole (rtd) for his painstaking effort at correcting my work at every stage of the thesis and Air Vice Marshall Istifanus Danbauchi for encouraging me in all aspects of my life. He had always shared some of his experiences with me and it is certain that “the words of elders are words of wisdom”.

 

        I also give thanks to Major SA Babatunde for encouraging me to enroll for COTIPSO with UNITARPOCI while we were serving in UN Mission in Burundi. My sincere appreciation also goes to Lt Col ASH Sa’ad the Adjutant Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, Lt Col Dikko of Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Centre Ghana, and  Wg Cdr SG Shehu the Tactical Air Command Public Relations Officer Makurdi, for their advise and encouragement. It really brought out the substance in me to bear on the thesis.

 

       I really appreciate the advise of my Director, Group Captain OO Kufeji, Director of Supply Headquarters, Nigerian Air Force. A perfect gentleman and a seasoned Supply Officer, he really thought me to give issues a little bit of analysis. I wish him a successful retirement life as he separates from the Nigerian Air Force on 31 December 2007. To Miss Naomi alias “Loose Control” of September 26 quarters Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji –Nigeria, I say thank you most sincerely for typing the manuscript for this thesis. My gratitude goes to my dear wife for her supportive role and understanding. Sometimes we stayed long hours in the cyber cafι sourcing for materials together. To my children: Shammah, Sharon and Nora you are wonderful. Thank you for your patience.

 

        I plead with those whose names could not be stated here to bear with me. They should note that without their immense contributions this work would not have been possible. Finally, I give all glory, honour and praise to God for this wonderful opportunity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                            CERTIFICATION

 

This is to certify that this work was carried out by Henry N. YURKUSI under my supervision.

 

 

 

                            Thesis Advisor 

 

                 Commodore Darius F. Onimole,rt.

   FSS, MSS, DSS, fellow of war college(fwc), psc(+)

M.Sc Political Science(Strategic Studies)-Univ of Ibadan.

 

 

 

JANUARY 2008

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                 

Pages

 

Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………. i  - iii

Title Page…………………………………………………………………………………………. iv

Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………………. v

Acknowledgement……………………………………………………………………….. vi - vii

List of Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………... viii -  ix

Executive Summary………………………………………………………………………..x -  xi

 

1. 0    INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………   1

 

1. 1    Statement of the Problem……………………………………………………………..    5

1. 2    Objective of the Study…………………………………. ……………………………….   6

1. 3    Justification of the Study……………………………………………………………….    7

1. 4    Scope and Limitations…………………………………………………………………..    7

1. 5    Basic Assumptions………………………………………………………………………..    8

1. 6    Methodology…………………………………………………………………………………   8

References……………………………………………………………………………………………..   9

 

2. 0    CONCEPTS AND EFFORTS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATION………………………………………………………………………………          ……………………   10                                                           

2. 1    Efforts of Logistic Support to Peacekeeping Operations…………………..    12       

 2. 2   Logistic Support Contribution of Some G8 Member Countries to

 Peacekeeping Operations……………………………………….. …………………………… . 14                 References…………………………………………………………………………………………….   18

 

3. 0    OVERVIEW OF THE LOGISTICS OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION…………….  19

         

3. 1    Logistics Planning ……………………………………………………………………..    21

3. 2    Logistic Planning Considerations…………………………………………………     22

3.3     Mission Analysis…………………………………………………………………………    22

3.4     Funding Support for Capacity Building for African Nations……………...   26

          References………………………………………………………………………………………… .   28

 

4. 0  MANAGEMENT OF DEPLOYED FORCES AND EQUIPMENT FOR A

 PEACEKEEPING MISSION …………………………………………………………………………….    29

 

          4. 1    Personnel Management in a Mission……………………………………………..  29

          4.2     Management of Equipment in a Mission……………………………………….   30

          4.3     Responsibility and Accountability for UNOE…………………………………..   32

          4.4     Reimbursement Procedure……………………………………………………….…    33

           4.5    Leasing Arrangement………………………………………………………………...    34

          4.6     Rapid Deployment of Forces to a Peacekeeping Mission  .…………….…  36

          4.7     The SHIRBRIG……………………………………………………………………….….   37

          4.8     SHIRBRIG Mandate……………………………………………………………….…..   37   

4.9     Personnel and Equipt Management of a Rapidly Deployed Force …….  40

4.10   Suggested Logistic Mgt System of a Rapidly Deployed PK Force……...  40

4.11   Training of Personnel and Peace Education………………………………………42   References……………………………………………………………………………………….….  46

 

5.0               LOGISTICS OF CONCLUDING A PEACEKEEPING MISSION………………….……   47

 

5.1     Primary Consideration of Concluding a Mission……………………….……   47

References…………………………………………………………………………………….…..   52

 

6.0      MY EXPERIENCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION  IN BURUNDI….    53

6.1          Movement to the mission Area………………………………..………………….   53

6.2     Arrival and Documentation at the Mission Area………………..…………..   54

6.3     Training and Development………………………………………..……. …………   54

6.4     Preparation of Reports……………………………………………..………….…….   56

6.5     Social Life……………………………………………………………..………….………   58

6.6     CTO and UN Leave Period……………………………………..………….………

CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………..……….………..   64

           END    NOTES ………………………………………………………………………………………..  67

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

 

 

1.

UN

-

United Nations

2.

DPKO

-

Department of Peace Keeping Operations

3.

SHIRBRIG

-

Stand by High Readiness Brigade

4.

DDR

-

Disarmament Demobilization and Re-Integration

5.

COTIPSO

-

Certificate of Training in Peace Support Operation

6.

ISS

-

Integrated Support Services

7.

MAPEX

-

Military Planning Exercise

8.

KAIPTC

-

Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

9.

USD

-

United States Dollars

10.

CAD

-

Canadian Dollars

11.

UNMIS

-

United Nations Mission in Sudan

12.

AMIS

-

African Mission in Sudan

13.

ECOWAS

-

Economic Community of West African States

14.

ECOMOG

-

ECOWAS Monitoring Group

15.

UNOCI

-

United Nations Operation in Cot d'Ivoire

16.

MINUSTAH

-

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

17.

MONUC

-

United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Congo

18.

UNAMI

-

United Nations Mission in Iraq

19.

UNOE

-

United Nations Owned Equipment

20.

COE

-

Contingent Owned Equipment

21.

TCC

-

Troop Contributing Country

22.

CAO

-

Chief Administrative Officer

23.

LOA

-

Letters of Assist

24.

UNSAS

-

United Nations Standby Arrangement System

25.

CSS

-

Combat Service Support

26.

NGO

-

Non Governmental Organization

27.

IDP

-

Internally Displaced Persons

28.

MILOB

-

Military Observer

29.

MSA

-

Mission Subsistence Allowance

30.

ONUB

-

United Nations Operation in Burundi

31.

SMO

-

Senior Military Observer

32.

MOP

-

Movement of Personnel

33.

IRC

-

International Rescue Committee

34.

GTZ

-

Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit

35.

ACCORD

-

African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

36.

COO

-

Chief Operations Officer

37.

AOR

-

Area of Responsibility

38.

CTO

-

Compulsory Time Off

39.

ASF

-

African Standby Force

40.

ACOTA

-

African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance

41.

BPST

-

British Peace Support Training

42.

RECAMP

-

Reinforcement de Capacities Africaines de Maintien de la Paix

43.

REC

-

Regional Economic Communities

 


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Peacekeeping has witnessed a tremendous increase and a significant change in the recent past in its nature, intensity and complexity. It has been characterized by multidisciplinary operations encompassing a wide range of activities that would enhance peace. The apparent increase in number and size of  peacekeeping operations could be an indication of a greater willingness by the international community to resolve conflicts generally, especially at  regional levels. However, this has presented significant problems to the UN in terms of supporting, manning and funding these  sporadic operations. How can the United Nations overcome these problems? The UN and the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) require tremendous support from corporate organizations, member states and individuals, among others, to enable it effectively support these operations.  

 

The G8 countries have demonstrated their support to the UN by making voluntary donations to the World Body in terms of equipment, funds, air and sea lifts to support its logistic requirements, in addition to their mandatory contributions to the organization. The UN has taken steps towards addressing the problems of effective logistics, capacity building and preparedness for peacekeeping operations by establishing the standby arrangement systems like the SHIRBRIG and regional standby arrangement systems such as the African Standby Force (ASF) for the integration and coordination of logistics planning for efficient and economical use of resources. TCCs must therefore endeavor to train their personnel in UN procedures and management of equipment in the mission area in order to enhance their capacity and readiness for peacekeeping operations. Equally important is the need to educate the locals on peace support operations and UN system and procedures.

 

To consolidate the peace that has been achieved in conflict ridden areas ‘Mission Area’ clearance which is an activity of concluding a mission, must be carried out. It is a very important  aspect of a peacekeeping operation, and also a peace building activity. Many children in former conflict ridden areas have been maimed by unexploded ordinances, because mission area clearance was not carried out or was not properly carried out.  Since mission area clearance is a long term activity, there should be continuity even after the peacekeeping force withdraws. A civilian contractor could be employed to carry out this very important task to allow the local populace to go about their normal duties. Alternatively, some selected locals could be trained to continue the activity of area clearance after the departure of the force. This option is more preferable as it reduces the cost and logistics required for the job. Furthermore it has a long lasting effect, sense of belonging and continuity on the community. Additionally, human rights component should continue to provide peace education in conflict ridden areas and also train alongside a few selected people from the local populace who would continue educating the affected belligerents on the need to sustain peace after the withdrawal of the force.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


HARNESSING THE LOGISTICS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

 

 

 

CHAPTER ONE

 

 

1.0     INTRODUCTION

 

Throughout the history of mankind, wars have been won through logistics strengths and capabilities or lost through the lack of them. As it is well known, logistics played a major role in the First and Second World Wars. The Allied Forces invasion of Europe was a highly skilled exercise in logistics, as was the defeat of General Rommel in the North African desert. This great German General, better known as the 'Desert Fox' asserted that before the fighting proper, the battles were won or lost by quartermasters.

 

       Well before the World Wars, it has been argued that the defeat of the British in the American War of Independence can largely be attributed to logistics failure. The British Army in America depended almost entirely upon Britain for supplies. At the height of the war there were 12,000 troops overseas and for the most part, they had not only to be equipped, but fed from the English homeland. In the first 6 years of the war, the administration of these vital supplies was totally inadequate, affecting the course of operations and the moral of troops. An organization capable of supplying the army was not developed until 1781 and by then it was too late. How then can this critical element of any operational activity be best described?

 

       Logistics is the organization of moving, lodging, and supplying troops and equipment - the detailed organization and implantation of a plan or operation. In its most fundamental sense, logistics is the art of transporting, housing, supplying and providing technical support to military troops. However, in the context of United Nations (UN) operations, logistics covers all aspects of the needs and physical support for missions to be carried out. This covers finances, supplies, transportation, technical support and housing needs, as well as administrative, communications, engineering and aviation services.

 

        In the recent past, UN peacekeeping operations have changed significantly in its nature, intensity and complexity. It has been characterized by multidisciplinary operations encompassing a wide range of elements to enhance peace. These include the supervision of cease-fire agreements, regrouping and demobilization of armed forces, destruction of weapons surrendered in disarmament exercises, and reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. Others include, but are not limited to facilitating the return of refugees, displaced persons, provision of humanitarian assistance, judicial and electoral reforms, rehabilitation and reconstruction, amongst others. But the World Body has had to cope with strident accusations of having taken on too may missions, for example, increasing from five in 1988 to seventeen in 1994, with a concomitant eightfold increase in blue-helmeted troops from 9,570 to about 73,393 and an exponential soaring in peace operations budget from $230 million to $3.6 billion. These have presented significant problems to the UN in terms of supporting, manning and funding of these operations.

 

      Peacekeeping operations will usually involve a mix of formed forces and ad hoc units, individual observers and groups from nations or non governmental organizations. The mix to be supported may include civilians and civil police as well as military personnel who may be called upon to perform political, humanitarian, security, disaster relief and liaison tasks in conjunction with the basic peacekeeping missions. However, it is important to bear in mind the type of assignment when planning for a peacekeeping operation. This is particularly important in terms of determining the required logistics for the particular mission, where support to the force will originate and who has the responsibility of sustaining the force.

 

         UN missions vary in size from small group of observers, to a combined operation of land, sea or air, involving tens of thousands of personnel. Logistics support has therefore been conceptualized to be tailored according to the task required, space and time considerations, manpower, materiel, environment, climate, on site infrastructure and availability of resources.  In carrying out the logistics functions of a peacekeeping operation, there is the need for the integration and coordination of the various types and sources of logistics support which covers all the needs of member states of the mission, be they military personnel, police or UN civilian staff provided by the governments. Coordinated planning is an essential aspect of logistics support to peacekeeping operations, because it is the means by which resources are efficiently and economically used to successfully manage these operations.  Logistics personnel therefore have the responsibility to coordinate the diverse needs and interests at the mission site with those of the contributing nations, as well as with personnel at the UN secretariat in New York.

 

As part of its effort towards ensuring an effective logistics support, the United Nations system, through its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has placed great emphasis on measures to improve the ability of its peacemaking organs to respond quickly to international crisis and to deploy for missions rapidly. A number of different initiatives all aimed at increasing the speed with which a peacekeeping mission can 'hit the ground' following a Security Council Resolution were initiated. To this end, the UN has been developing a valuable network of early warning systems concerning environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threats of famine and the spread of diseases. The essential need was to strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources could be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyze what action might be taken by the World Body to alleviate it. A recent and most purposeful initiative involved the setting up of a Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), a multilateral initiative which emerged under the impetus of the Nordic countries; with about 4,000 to 5,000 troops already committed. The Secretary-General noted at the launch of the planning element of SHIRBRIG that the international community should thus be able to intervene swiftly and effectively in crises situations. In the short term, the rapid deployment of a peacekeeping operation can prevent enormous agony of innocent citizens in a crisis area; therefore, the establishment of SHIRBRIG is a welcomed idea. SHIRBRIG focuses on operational coordination to achieve the highest possible level of intra-opera ability and works towards developing common procedures, training standards, operational and logistic concepts.

      There are other Standby Arrangement Systems under the auspices of the UN which dates back to 1994, for which so far nearly 70 countries have identified 88,000 troops, thereby greatly enhancing DPKO's capacity to plan a potential mission. A major component of the system is that member states identify which type and how many troops and equipment would be made available for peacekeeping. Their deployment by Member States would still be subject to national political decisions. DPKO has created a database of the potential troops and services which may be made available by Member States of SHIRBRIG, which would greatly alleviate the logistical problems of the past. Indeed,DPKO now has at least some idea of the equipment, services and troops available and has a realistic idea of what can be accomplished on the ground before ever setting up the logistics base or cell, in the mission area.  However, in as much as peacekeeping operations involve multinational forces, there is the need to develop an integrated logistics arrangement and coordination among participating nations and the UN.  Such coordination like that of SHIRBRIG and the standby arrangement systems would greatly enhance the overall effectiveness of logistics efforts of a peacekeeping operation.

 

1.1    Statement of the Problem.      Following the end of the Cold War in 1990, a profusion of intra-national threats flared up in utter disappointment of pacifists world-wide. These new threats in which non governmental parties, warlords, rebellious factions, ethnic leaders, thugs and so on were usually involved, often proved far harder to resolve than regional conflicts between states. Thus, the last decade of this century has seen larger, more complex UN peacekeeping missions, than in the previous 5 decades of the organization's existence, which has presented significant problems to the UN in supporting, manning and funding of these operations. There is therefore an urgent need for a well coordinated logistics support, as well as availability of some calculated contingency supplies of anticipated logistic requirements. For this reason, it is of utmost necessity to establish more early warning indicators of carefully assessed potential conflict areas and/or rapidly deteriorating environmental threats, both at different regional levels of the world as well as within the DPKO at the UN. This is with the obvious objective of facilitating rapid response to these emergencies - since their contingencies would have been fairly assessed - thus greatly enhancing the successful conduct of both peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations.

 

1.2    Objective of the Study.   The objective of this study is to examine the trend of peacekeeping in the decades following the end of the Cold War and to stress the importance of adequate funding as well as careful marriage of highly articulated strategic planning of UN operations to meet the challenges of the complex nature of contemporary conflict resolution in recent times. This may involve conduct of elections in post-conflict environments, Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) and the provision of humanitarian services in disaster areas, amongst others.

 

1.3    Justification of the Study.  This study is relevant as it could generally serve as a reference material for logistics personnel of peacekeeping operations. It is equally useful for urgent intervention in disaster relief, due to the prevailing change in climate which have sometimes led to natural disasters such as violent earth or sea quakes (Tsunamis) and tropical storms in the form of hurricanes, amongst others, requiring the prompt intervention of the UN. There is therefore the need to stress adequate planning and increased funding- more so- in view of the unfortunate realities of the stateless but highly mobile fanatical terrorists in the international security landscape.  The study is also required by the researcher for the award of the United Nations Certificate of Training in Peace keeping Operations (COTIPSO).

 

 1.4   Scope and Limitations.    This study highlights the logistics activities of a typical peacekeeping force vis-ΰ-vis the complex nature of most conflict resolution in recent times. In this light the study shall cover logistic activities of peacekeeping operations from the 1990s to 2006. The main limitation encountered in conducting this study is that of funds. For instance, the desire of the researcher to travel wide to some on-going UN Peacekeeping Missions and particularly to the UN Logistics Base Brindisi Italy was thus inhibited. This limitation however would not invalidate the findings of the research since there are literatures on the phenomenon of logistics support to peacekeeping operations. Consequently, published books, Internet resources, conference proceedings and official reports were found to have some of the required data to enhance the credibility of this study.

1.5    Basic Assumptions.  The study assumes that the UN would retain a much more active and central role in the management of world peace, which is presently very vulnerable, and thus accord quality attention to the funding of logistics in support of peace efforts in envisaged international flash points.

 

1.6    Methodology.   Secondary sources of data were employed in the collection of materials for the study. These were mainly essential books, magazines and professional logistics journals.  Other sources of data included the electronic media, official publications on logistics, relevant literatures and the Internet.  The literatures and data obtained from these sources were analyzed qualitatively before making deductions. We shall therefore subsequently examine how the concepts as well as efforts of logistic support to peacekeeping operations have developed within the period under consideration.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Notes and References:

 

1.   Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping - Report of the Secretary General, pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council (New York: United Nations, 1992).

 

2.  Martin Christopher, Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Creating Value-Adding Networks (Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education Limited, 2005).

 

3.   NATO Logistics Handbook (http://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/logist97.htm).

 

4.     "Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations". (A Course Produced by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping).

 

5.     "Operational Logistical Support of United Nations   Peacekeeping Missions; Intermediate Logistics Course". (A Course Produced by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping).

 

6.     “British Armed Forces Joint Logistics” (Joint Warfare Publication 4-00).

 

7.     "Logistics for Peace” (http:www.shirbrig.dk).

 

CHAPTER TWO

 

 

2.0 CONCEPTS AND EFFORTS OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

 

 Logistics support to peacekeeping operations varies in size and shape in accordance with the nature and tasks of required assignments.   They also vary from small group of observers who may be civilians, police or military or a mixture of all, to a complex mission involving tens of thousands of personnel. Their operations could also extend from land, sea and air operations; thus throwing up a wide range of logistics requirement needed to support such missions. A number of concepts for the support of such operations have proven to be workable and valuable. They include Self Reliance Concept, Lead Member State Concept, Force Logistic Support Group Concept and the Civilian Contract Support Concept amongst others.

 

a.     Self Reliance Concept.  The self reliance concept occurs when in some cases reliance on the local economy may be the best method of support.  It may require a small reception team at a point of entry that maintains logistic links with contributing member states and the UN. However, specialist repair of vehicles, communications or technical equipment would be brought in from outside the mission site.  In a case where one of the contributing countries has a modern, civilian infrastructure, then self-sufficiency would likely to be effective. 

 

b.     Lead Member State ConceptMedium size missions may centre command on one principal member state contingent.  In such cases, that member state would usually assume responsibility for all logistic support and maintain re-supply links with its home base. Other nations' contingents would rely on the principal member state contingent for their administrative and logistic needs. However, before a UN mission begins, it is expected that a negotiated bilateral agreements should have taken place between the UN and the different nations engaged in the mission to ensure financial reimbursement of services provided.  The lead member state's logistics organization would however not contain representatives of other contributing member nations, in order to ensure that all national interests are taken into account.

 

c.     The Force Logistic Support Group Concept.  Logistic missions with considerable equipment and volume of transactions can be supported by specialized logistic support groups.  These groups are organized as an extension of the lead member state concept.  In this case one member state assumes overall responsibility for the coordination of the Force Logistic Base as part of Integrated Support Services (ISS). The Force Logistic Support Group concept is normally implemented at the planning stage of a mission.  Once the Force Logistic Support Group is established, it is charged with the responsibility of carrying out some tasks such as supply planning which involves identifying requirements, range and quantity of items required to support a unit.  Its phases include identification of items of supply, cataloguing, sealing and issuing requisitions.  The task of acquisition of material is the process of obtaining material and services, whether of a military or commercial origin.  It includes receiving, care and storage of material and issue to units.  They also carry out some task of disposal which is the removal of material from the supply system through sale, trade-in or destruction.  In addition they maintain the inventory which is the control of material by means of established accounting and management procedures.

 

d.     Civilian  Contract Support Concept.  As a mission progresses, it becomes necessary to make available the requirements needed to support the mission.  The overall aim is to achieve logistic organization in the most economical ways and manner which meets the demands of the force, as well as what is needed for military manpower for redeployment.  Decisions are coordinated by Force Headquarters and constitute a unique set of requirements for each mission.  These are often achieved by including civilian contract support.  In a case where a civilian support is possible and cost effective the military logistic support group would then be phased out.

 

 

2. 1     Efforts of Logistics Support to Peacekeeping Operations

                                          

Since it is not all governments that can provide their battalions with the equipment needed to support their mission, then it becomes imperative to look at the provision of logistics support to peacekeeping operations as a major challenge to the UN. This of course has become a source of concern to peacekeeping operations especially in the recent past. In their quest for the maintenance of world peace, with special reference to Africa, the G8 countries committed themselves towards the prevention and resolution of conflict in the continent. As it is well known, G8 member states are made of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The G8 which was founded in the African Action Plan created at the 2002 Kananaskis summit was built upon at the 2003 Evian Summit with the Joint Africa-G8 Action Plan to enhance African countries' capabilities to undertake peace support operations. The G8 countries committed themselves to work with their African counterparts to develop local capacities to undertake peace support operations, in accordance with the UN Charter. This is aimed at preventing outbreaks of violence, and to ensure that any conflict that erupts is quickly diffused.

 

The 2002 G8 action plan of enhancing the peace support operations capabilities of African countries basically centered on past efforts undertaken by the G8 and its African partners. The G8 recognizes the financial and logistical difficulties faced by many African nations when deploying troops and equipment internationally throughout the continent. Consequently, it focused on building established frameworks for transportation and logistical support to ensure that the troops are supported to prevent and diffuse conflict as quick as possible. It was also aimed at ensuring that, they can promptly deploy at where they are needed and are properly equipped to undertake peacekeeping and peace support operations. In terms of training, the G8 maintains a long term goal to train about 75,000 peacekeepers by the year 2010.

      

2.2    Logistics Support Contributions of Some G8 Member Countries to Peacekeeping Operation

 

The following G8 member countries are noted to have made the stated contributions to logistics of the UN peacekeeping forces in recent times. They include Italy, Japan, Russia and Canada.

 

         a. Italy.   Italy has demonstrated compliance with the commitment it made concerning peace support operations. It has succeeded in providing African peacekeepers with other logistical and transportation assistance.   Italy has continued to contribute to improving logistical support arrangements through funding and operating a workshop at the UN Logistical Support Base in Brindisi. Starting from 8-26 November 2005, groups of mid to high ranking African officers were educated about various aspects of peace support operations.  At this event a module was presented by the Scuola di Applicazione and the Brigata Alpina Taurinense of the Italian Armed Forces to these field grade officers in an effort to introduce them to the Military Planning Exercise (MAPEX). This training educated the officers in operational planning procedures and provided valuable training in the utilization of logistical equipment used in UN peace support operations.  Italy has also provided a facility in Vicenza for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, which is shared with the newly established European Gendarme Force headquarters.  The Center of Excellence which began offering classes in 2005 in an effort to realize the goal of training officers and non-commissioned officers is also operational.  It is envisaged that within a period of 5 to 6 years the Centre intends to train about 3000 officers and non commissioned officers in order to further provide interoperability training for military contingents that will interact with stability police units during peace support operations. Italy also made financial contributions to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana.         

 

b. Japan.  Since June 2004, Japan has taken steps to comply with the commitment she set out in the 2004 Sea Island Summit.  In 2004 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Japanese Non Governmental Organization conducted a joint survey mission in eastern Chad to assess the humanitarian situation of Sudanese refugees.  The joint survey reiterated the need for increased transport capacity on both land and air routes for a more efficient procurement of aid.  According to the former Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Koizumi who stated at the Asian-African Summit that; Japan was currently undergoing consultations with the UN to donate an estimated $2 million (USD) of equipment to African troops participating in the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).  This equipment will include trucks, 4x4 vehicles and land mine detectors, among others. 

 

c. Russia.   Russia has been constantly involved in African conflicts, largely as a result of its permanent seat in the UN Security Council.  In this capacity, Russia has contributed in the negotiation of peace settlements, determination of mandates of peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction.  The country also maintains 230 servicemen and security men as part of UN peacekeeping operations in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Western Sahara, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The country has been involved in direct communication with the Sudanese government in order to coordinate peacekeeping operations in the country.  Russia plans to send 50 military observers and 20 civilian police officers to join the UNMIS.  Moreover, Russia’s participation includes the training of African peacekeepers and their transportation to mission locations.

 

        d. Canada.    Canada has demonstrated a high level of compliance to its commitments in Africa. At the UN General Assembly on 22 September, 2005, the former Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Paul Martin professed the country’s interest in enhancing African Union (AU) capabilities to carry out its peacekeeping task. This they started by offering a contribution of $20 million (CAD) to AU peacekeeping operations. Earlier the Minister of National Defence Bill Graham announced a donation of $250,000 (CAD) to the AU in basic army supplies, consisting of helmets, flashlights, protective insect nets, cots and pocket knives etc. A similar contribution of basic army supplies totaling $1.165 million (CAD) was made to the AU forces by the Canadian Department of National Defence.

       

        It is evident from the foregoing that putting together all the logistic requirements of a UN peacekeeping force is a very costly business and very few countries can cope with such an expensive venture, especially in Africa.  It is therefore, necessary for member nations of the UN and other organizations to support logistics efforts of peacekeeping forces, be it in terms of personnel, equipment or funds. This has prepared us for the overview of logistics of peacekeeping operations thus far.

 

 

 

Notes and References:

 

1. “NATO Logistics Handbook”(http://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/logist97.htm).

 

2.     “Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (A Course Produced by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping).

 

3.     “Operational Logistical Support of United Nations   Peacekeeping Missions; Intermediate Logistics Course” (A Course Produced by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping).

 

4.     “British Armed Forces Joint Logistics” (Joint Warfare Publication 4-00).

 

5.     “Logistics Contributions of G8 countries to UN Peacekeeping Operations”   (http: www.g8.utoronto.ca)  .

                       

 

 

CHAPTER THREE

 

3.0    OVERVIEW OF LOGISTICS OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

 

 

 

Generally, after security, logistics is the next area of activity where the military component makes its greatest contribution to peace keeping operations. Troop-contributing countries are one of several sources of logistic support to peacekeeping operations. The UN also secures logistical support for its peacekeeping operations from stocked UN Owned Equipment (UNOE), commercial contracts or an arrangement  by which a third country provides direct or bilateral support to specific national contingents that may lack certain logistic assets.

 

Since the early 1990s, logistics planning for peacekeeping operations where former military units are part of the operation’s structure has envisaged an ISS system involving the military component, the civilian administration and support component and an external contractor element. Integrated and consolidation of support resources is vital to the success of peacekeeping missions, which often operate in areas where the infrastructure is severely damaged or destroyed and the UN must rely on its own resources for basic necessities and support. Support units, such as Engineer Squadrons or Companies, Transport Units, Hospitals and others are expected to integrate their work with UN personnel and private contractors to make the best use of resources available to support all components of the mission. The management and control of these joint resources is the responsibility of the Chief Technical Services Officer, who reports directly to the mission’s Chief Administrative Officer but is responsible for delivery of support to the mission as a whole.

 

The UN logistics system relies on the self sufficiency of member states at unit level for a given period normally 60 days for traditional missions and 90 days for complex missions. This means that the unit is expected to deploy with everything it requires to sustain its force for 60 or 90 days as the case may be. This period is designed to allow time for the mission administration to organize the Mission Headquarters and the mission logistic structure, such as acquiring accommodation and to conclude the logistic support arrangements. However, most countries especially in Africa have not been able to adequately provide logistics support to their troops especially within this stipulated period. Examples of inadequate logistics for the support of a peacekeeping force revealed itself in the African Union Mission (AMIS) in Darfur and Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia. The report of the ECOMOG lessons described the entire logistic system of that operation as ad-hoc and incoherent. For example, Britain provided support to Ghana, and Belgium to Republic of Benin. Individual troop contributing countries also provided their own contingent owned equipment and United State's equipment were supplied to the Force via a company. Though these combined efforts provided some logistics support to the troops, there was no integration and coordination whatsoever. Of course, it became necessary for the UN to take over these missions, because of the overwhelming logistics requirements among other reasons.

 

Command of all military units, including logistics units, rests with the mission’s Force Commander and the military chain of command. The integrated support structure, however, provides the ability to carry out integrated and coordinated planning which allows all mission support elements to work together to achieve overall mission priorities.

 

3.1    Logistics Planning

The year 2004 witnessed an unprecedented surge in UN Peacekeeping Operations, widening prospects for ending conflicts and raising hopes for peace in war-torn countries. By the end of that year, the number and scope of these operations approached their highest levels ever. At the same time, these new demands placed huge new strains on UN resources, and prompted the World Body to take a critical look at its ability to plan and manage peacekeeping missions so that it cOULD meet these challenges with an effective response. In addition to the 14 on-going field operations that period, the UN DPKO was also managing three new missions in early 2004 which were established during the year, with more on the horizon. While the Organization was still deploying its largest peacekeeping operation in Liberia, the UN Operation in Cτte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was launched in April, with the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) opening two months later. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) underwent a major restructuring and expansion, replacing Liberia as the largest peacekeeping operation and opening new headquarters in the volatile east of the country. Planning also continued for a mission in Sudan to deploy, once a peace agreement was signed. DPKO also provided administrative and logistic support to the UN mission in Iraq (UNAMI).

 

The logistics needed to organize these missions had been daunting. The ability of Member States to provide funds, troops and equipment has been severely strained. It was obvious that the surge had pushed the UN system to the outer limits of its capacity. DPKO noted that for every person in the Peacekeeping Department at the New York headquarters, there were more than 100 in the field, thereby creating major challenges in the areas of planning, logistics, procurement and command and control. Therefore some critical issues must be considered while planning for the logistics requirement of supporting a peacekeeping operation. 

 

3.2    Logistics Planning Considerations.   In planning for a peace support operation, so many factors would need to be considered for an effective support. However, before looking at these factors it is necessary that a critical analysis of the entire mission is carried out to facilitate good planning and effectiveness.

 

3.3    Mission Analysis.  Mission Analysis defines the operational task to be performed and the resulting logistic requirements. Some tasks are specified by the mandate of the mission, while others are implied. For example, specified tasks might be to disarm opposing factions. This is a clear task. The implied task however may include storage and accountability for weapons,